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STOCK PURCHASE PLANS FOR THE
RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEE
ALLAN J. PARKER t
1. INTRODUCTION
D URING the past few years considerable attention has been
directed to stock purchase and stock option plans for
executives and key personnel.1 It will be the scope of this
article, however, to discuss the acquisition of stock in an
employer corporation by the rank-and-file worker through
an employer-sponsored stock purchase plan, together with
selected tax problems involved in the sponsoring of such a
plan.
2
Purpose of Plan
From the standpoint of management, there are several
advantages sought to be attained by encouraging stock pur-
chases on the part of rank-and-file employees. Apart from
the fact that these employees may furnish needed venture
capital without the restrictions and expense of an underwrit-
t Member of the New York Bar.
1 See, e.g., Blodgett, Deferred Compensation Plans for Executives,
6 N. Y. U. ANN. INsT. FED. TAX. 809 (1948); Ross, Tax Consequences of
Employees' Stock Option Plans, 26 TAXES 137 (1948); WASHINGTON AND
ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE ExEcuTmV c. 6 (Rev. ed. 1951).
A stock purchase plan for the rank-and-file employee means that subject to a
reasonable length of service requirement, it is open to all personnel, not merely
selected "key" employees. Although little emphasis will be placed on non-tax
problems, this is not to say that such problems do not exist, particularly from
the personnel standpoint. See BOMAR, FELLERS, et al., HANDBOOK FOR PENSION
PLANNING C. 9 (B. N. A. 1949); MAYO, THE HUMAN PROBLEMS OF INDUS-
TRIAL CIVILIZATION 119-121 (1946).
2 Also beyond the scope of this paper are the numerous corporate-law
problems involved in such a plan. These would include (1) the necessity for
stockholder approval of the plan, (2) the treatment of pre-emptive rights of
non-employee stockholders, (3) the legality of the sale of stock for a note or
for future services, (4) the problem of "consideration" for the receipt of a
bargain-purchase opportunity on the part of employees, and (5) the necessity
for a Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 1933.
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ing agreement,3 widespread stock ownership among em-
ployees is believed to increase their interest in the welfare
and success of their company,4 to reduce employee turnover r
and to augment an established pension plan by the employee's
personal savings. In the absence of such savings, pension
benefits may prove woefully inadequate, and the primary
function of the employer's pension plan-provision for the
retirement of employees who are too old to work effectively
-may be vitiated,6 and thus the employer may find itself
faced with the same personnel and labor problems that led
to the adoption of a pension plan in the first place. An addi-
tional reason for stock purchase plans for rank-and-file em-
ployees may be to meet the resentment which organized labor
may express against stock options and similar incentive de-
vices for executives.7 Accordingly, a corporation may occa-
sionally have two plans, one for executives and the other for
other employees."
For the employee, a company stock purchase plan con-
stitutes a significant fringe benefit, usually offering a con-
3 See AMERICAN TEL. & TEL. CO., PROSPECTUS (Jan. 5, 1950) ; MINNESOTA
MINING AND MFG. CO., PROSPECTUS (Nov. 9, 1949).
4 See E. R. SQU IBB & SONS, PROSPECTUS (Nov. 14, 1950); FOOD MA-
CHINERY AND CHEMICAL CORP., PROSPECTUS (July 17, 1951) ("to secure to
the Company the advantages of the incentive inherent in stock ownership on
the part of employees and to create in such employees a proprietary interest
in, and a greater concern for the Company"). There is even some indication
of such long-range objectives as to reduce the intensity of the class struggle
by making capitalists of workers through the widespread diffusion of company
securities. See SANDERS, EFFECTS or TAXATION ON EXECUTnES 121 (1951);
LEYS, ETHICS FOR POLCY DECISION 148 (1952).
5 In opening a $5,000 swimming pool in Dallas, Texas, for the employees
of the Prudential Life Insurance Company, an executive vice-president of that
company asserted that if this pool reduced personnel turnover by as little as
10% it would pay for itself within a year. Fringe benefits of this nature,
designed to attract and hold rank-and-file personnel, run a wide gamut from
free samples to daily ice cream served at the employee's desk. See Wall Street
Journal, April 28, 1952, p. 1, col. 6.
6 CHEMICAL BANK & TRUST Co., THRIFT PLANS: A NEW ANSWER TO AN
OLD PROBLEM 10-11 (1952) ; Letter of the President (Dow Chemical Co.) in
STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS FOR EMPLOYEES 10 (N. Y. Stock Exch. 1950) ("The
provision for completely adequate retirement incomes would represent a degen-
erating influence, offensive to the honor and independence and initiative of the
individual. I do not think it makes any difference whether the provider is gov-
ernmental, industrial or a combination of the two.").
7 See A. M. I., THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR 5 (April 1952); SSB, SALARY
STABILIZATION 18 (1952).
8 See FRUEHAUF TRAILER CO., PROSPECTUS (June 18, 1951); UNITED
STATES PLYWOOD CORP., PROSPECTUS (Sept. 28, 1951).
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venient method of saving money, a substantially larger rate
of return than savings bonds or banks offer, and most impor-
tant, a very thinly veiled increase in compensation.
Features of Stock Purchase Plans
Reports filed by a number of corporations which have
recently instituted stock acquisition plans for rank-and-file
employees reveal several features designed to implement these
various objectives within the framework of feasible adminis-
tration. Most of these are common to all plans.
In order to prevent mere speculation in the stock, and
to avoid unnecessary and costly setting-up of stock purchase
accounts for merely temporary employees, most companies
limit eligibility to employees with a certain minimum period
of service,9 and provide for the forfeiture of company-
sponsored benefits by employees leaving the corporation's
service before they have completed the acquisition of their
stock.10 Similarly, since the employer has no interest in en-
couraging stock ownership on favorable terms' by other
than employees, the rights to purchase stock are non-
transferable, 1 except by death.12  The employer, of course,
reserves the right to terminate the plan at any time,'3 and
may stipulate that participation in the plan gives an em-
ployee no vested right to his job.' 4
Although from a labor-relations standpoint payroll de-
ductions pursuant to a stock purchase plan decrease "take-
9 See AmmIcAN TEL. & TEL. Co., EMPLOYEES STocK PLAN, PROSPECTUS(Jan. 5, 1950) ; International Harvester Co., Employees' Common Stock Sub-
scription Plan in STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS FOR EMPLOYEES 23 (N. Y. Stock
Exch. 1950) (excludes those with less than two years service); FooD MA-
CHINERY AND CHEMICAL CORP., PROSPECTUS (July 17, 1951). The American
Tel. & Tel. Company, snpra, eliminates top officers from the plan, presumably
because other provision in the line of incentive compensation is made for them.
10 See International Harvester Co., supra note 9.
"1 See Dow CHEMICAL Co., PROSPECTUS 4 (Dec. 10, 1949); International
Harvester Co., supra note 9; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Employee Stock Plat
in Srxxn OWNERSHIP PLANS FOR EMPLOYEES 40 (N. Y. Stock Exch. 1950).
2 See Dow CHEMICAL Co., supra note 11; E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, PRoS-
PECTUs 4 (Jan. 3, 1950).
s13 See FOOD MACHINERY AND CHEMICAL CORP., supra note 9; International
Harvester Co., supra note 9.
14 See FRUEHAUF TRAILER Co., PROSPECTUS (June 18, 1951) ; General Elec.
Co., Employees Savings and Stock Bonus Plan in STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS
FOR EMPLOYEES 20 (N. Y. Stock Exch. 1950).
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home pay," the regularity and relative ease of collection 15
thereby assured have placed this method of payment by em-
ployees in every plan examined. Usually, however, the num-
ber of shares which may be purchased and the amount to be
deducted are limited to a given proportion of the employee's
salary.16
The heart of any stock purchase plan, however, lies in
the price of the stock and the terms of payment. At this
point the plans evidence considerable diversity. They include
the following: (1) a stock bonus plan in connection with in-
vestment in government bonds, (2) a sale of stock on credit
with dividends applied against purchase price, (3) a de-
ferred deposit subscription at a price less than market, (4) a
qualified profit-sharing plan. The tax aspects of each of
these plans will be analyzed in the following sections.
Use of Treasury Stock
Before discussing in detail the tax effects of four typical
plans both upon employer and employee, one point must be
noted by way of introduction. It is assumed that the em-
ployer will offer to employees authorized but unissued com-
mon stock and not treasury stock. Otherwise, the long-
standing tax problem involved with the buying and selling
by a corporation of treasury shares intrudes upon the scene,
a detailed consideration of which is beyond the scope of this
article.17
15 See CHEMICAL BANK & TRUST Co., THRIFT PLANS: A NEW ANSWER TO
AN OLD PROBLEM 9 (1952). Payroll deductions may be the only practical way
for a wage-earner to save regularly.
Is See AMERICAN TEL. & TEL. CO., PROSPECTUS (Jan. 5, 1950) (limits allot-
ments to $25 per month) ; Dow CHEMICAL CO., PROSPECTUS 4 (Dec. 10, 1949)
(limits total amount of deductions which employee may authorize to the lesser
of either $50 or 10% of annual salary) ; International Harvester Co., Employees'
Common Stock Subscription Plan in STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS FOR EMPLOYEES
23 (N. Y. Stock Exch. 1950) (limits subscription to one-third of annual
salary). In general, the limiting factor seems to be 10 to 20%. Such a limi-
tation, of course, reduces the cost of the plan and curtails possible discrimination
in favor of wealthier employees.
IT Briefly, the Treasury Regulations provide that whenever a company deals
in its own shares in the same manner that it would deal in the shares of any
other corporation, it will realize gain or loss on the acquisition or disposition.
U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-15; see Commissioner v. H. W. Porter &
Co., 187 F. 2d 939 (3d Cir. 1951); Commissioner v. Rollins Burdick Hunter
Co., 174 F. 2d 698 (7th Cir. 1949); Commissioner v. Batten, Barton, Durstine
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II. STOCK BONUS PLAN
Besides the advantage of the mere mechanical factor of
regular payroll deductions, employers have frequently con-
cluded that stock ownership plans required some other at-
traction for large-scale employee participation. If rank-and-
file employees have not purchased the employer's stock on
their own account, it is not likely they will buy it merely
because the employer offers it for sale. An executive, inter-
ested primarily in long-term capital gains, might be eager
to purchase stock at market price with no concessions; the
rank-and-file employee would not. Usually the added attrac-
tion consists of a reduction in price; and there is no way that
the price of stock can be made more attractive than to give
it away as a bonus. Thus, a simple and straightforward
manner of placing stock in the hands of employees is simply
to pay bonuses in stock rather than cash.' 8 The tax problems
are simple too. The bonus is deductible by the employer to
the extent of the fair market value of the stock as additional
compensation,' 9 and taxable on the same basis to the em-
ployee.20 The stock, when issued, would become part of the
employer's invested capital for excess profits tax purposes.2 '
& Osborn, Inc., 171 F. 2d 474 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 816
(1949). In each one of the above cases the Tax Court had held on the facts
that because the primary purpose of placing stock in the hands of employees
was to increase their proprietary interest in the company-a result which the
purchase and sale of the stock of another corporation would not effectuate, the
Regulations did not apply. The Circuit Courts reversed. SeeH. W. Porter
& Co., 14 T. C. 307 (Rev. by Ct.) (1950), rev'd, 187 F. 2d 939 (3d Cir. 1951),
where the Tax Court respectfully declined to follow the earlier Circuit Court
decisions. Whether its rebellion has finally been quelled is still an open ques-
tion. Cf. Juvenile Shoe Corp. of America, 17 T. C. 1186, 1190 (1952).
28 See Du PONT CORP. OF AmERICA, PROSPECTUS (Jan. 29, 1951).
19 Alger-Sullivan Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 57 F. 2d 3 (5th Cir. 1932);
cf. James D. Mooney, 9 T. C. 713 (1947). Ordinarily for rank-and-file em-
ployees the question of reasonableness of compensation seldom arises, at least
in a large corporation. But cf. Patton v. Commissioner, 168 F. 2d 28 (6th
Cir. 1948).2 0 INT. REV. CoDE § 22(a), U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.2 2(a)-3. The amount
upon which tax was paid would then constitute the employee's basis for the
sfock as though he had received a cash bonus and then bought the stock. U. S.
Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-i; cf. Artis C. Bryan, 16 T. C. 972 (1951).
21 INT. REV. CODE § 437(d). The better theory would be that the employees
had taken a cash obligation in stock, Charles F. L'Hommedieu & Sons CO.,
6 B. T. A. 41 (1927), rather than that services constituted "property paid in"
for stock. Cf. Palomar Laundry, 7 T. C. 1300 (1946).
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Stock bonuses of this sort, however, may become unrea-
sonably expensive if they are given to all employees without
regard to outstanding services calling for extra compensa-
tion.22  Moreover, there is at least no conscious element of
employee savings in such a plan. Consequently, stock bonus
plans are occasionally tied into employee savings plans, as
in the General Electric Company Plan.23
Under this plan the employer purchases United States
Savings Bonds for the employee's account through regular
payroll deductions. To encourage the retention as well as
the purchase of these bonds, the employer holds them in cus-
tody for a period of five years. Each year the employer de-
clares a bonus in company stock, measured by the aggregate
cost of bonds purchased by the employee under the plan that
year. At the end of a five-year holding period, the bonds and
the shares of stock are transferred to the participating em-
ployee, together with any dividends declared on the stock
while it was held.
Here again the employer, presumably, will seek to de-
duct the fair market value of the shares of stock transferred
to the employee's account as a bonus in the year of transfer.
If, however, the employee's rights are forfeitable, the Regu-
lations deny the employer a deduction for such contribution
in that year, and may deny it altogether. 24  The reasoning
is that no deduction is allowable when the contribution is
made to the employee's account, because the employee's rights
are then forfeitable; and no deduction is allowed when dis-
tribution is made from the trust to the employee, because
the employer has "paid" nothing in that year. 25  If the em-
22 Moreover, of course, a bonus that everybody received may have little of
that incentive effect that a bonus is intended to produce. WASHINGTON AND
ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE ExEcuTvE c. 2 (Rev. ed. 1951).
23 See General Elec. Co., Employees Savzngs and Stock Bons Plan in
STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS FOR EMPLOYEES 17 (N. Y. Stock Exch. 1950); see
also STANDARD OIL Co. OF IND., PROSPECrus (March 19, 1951).
24 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(p)-il: "If an amount is paid during the
taxable year but the rights of the employee therein are forfeitable at the time
the amount is paid, no deduction is allowable for such amoulnt for any taxable
year." This would be an example of a case wherein, presumably, tax con-
siderations would outweigh the desire to reduce turnover through possible for-
feiture of benefits. See notes 5, 9 supra.
25 See Nelson, Stock Purchase and Bonus Plans. Qualified and Nonqualified,
29 TAXES 890, 894 (1951). If, however, the forfeited stock is made payable
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ployee's rights are vested, however, whether or not the shares
are physically delivered, the employer is entitled to a tax de-
duction for these payments equal to the fair market value of
the stock as additional compensation, 26 but not for dividends
paid on these shares. If they are validly issued and outstand-
ing shares, dividends paid upon them do not become deduc-
tible compensation simply because they happen to be paid to
employees.
Conversely, of course, the employee receives taxable in-
come measured by the fair market value of the stock when
the shares are transferred irrevocably to his account,27 ex-
cept that, again, if his rights are forfeitable, he is apparently
taxed on the stock only when his rights become indefeasibly
vested.28
Even under this plan, however, the employee is not ac-
quiring a proprietary interest in the company with his own
money; he is simply buying government bonds and receiving
a bonus for doing so. Moreover, if the employer's stock is a
high-priced one, either its contribution must be so large that
the plan may become prohibitively expensive for the em-
ployer, or it will take the employee too long to purchase a
sufficient number of bonds to receive even one share of
stock.2 9
to other employees so that it cannot revert to the employer, the deduction may
be allowed. Texas Pipe Line Co., 32 B. T. A. 125 (1935), aff'd, 88 F. 2d 278
(3d Cir.), cert. den~ied, 302 U. S. 706 (1937). Moreover, employees' rights
will not be considered forfeitable where there is only a remote contingency that
the employee will not in fact enjoy them. General Outdoor Advertising Co.
v. Helvering, 89 F. 2d 882 (2d Cir. 1937).
28 Cf. Thurman v. Studebaker Corp., 88 F. 2d 984 (7th Cir. 1937). It is
possible, of course, that the Commissioner might contend that these stock
bonuses were not paid for personal services actually rendered inasmuch as they
were paid for saving, not working. INT. REv. CoDE § 23(a) (1) (A). Obvi-
ously, however, the payments are not gifts and the employer can show that
it is to his advantage to encourage thrift among employees.
27U S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-3. Presumably this bonus would con-
stitute "wages" within the meaning of the social security tax and withholding
sections of the Internal Revenue Code, Sections 1621(a) and 1426(a).
28 Cf. Thurman v. Studebaker Corp., supra note 26.
28 For example, if the employer's bonus is as much as 15% of bonds pur-
chased and the stock is selling at $150, the employee would have to accumulate
$1,000 worth of bonds before he would be entitled to a share of stock. If pay-
roll deductions are limited to 10% of wages, it is clear that such a plan may in
practice operate primarily for the benefit of executives and not rank-and-file
personnel.
[ VOL. 27
1953] EMPLOYEE STOCK PURCHASE PLANS 241
III. DIVIDEiNDS CREDIT PLAN
If the employer is unwilling simply to give stock to its
rank-and-file workers, it may wish to encourage employee
stock ownership by selling stock to them on easy terms and,
in whole or in part, permitting the stock to pay for itself by
crediting dividends against the purchase price. Thus the
employee feels he is acquiring an immediate proprietary in-
terest in the company through his own efforts.
A typical plan of this nature is that of E. R. Squibb &
Sons.3 0 This plan provides that stock may be subscribed for
by employees at current market price. Five per cent of the
subscription price must be paid down, and the balance paid
by the employee at the rate of not less than five per cent per
year, less any amounts received in such year as cash dividends
on the shares subscribed for and applied in reduction of the
unpaid balance. The subscriber is required to pay interest
on the unpaid balance at a rate of not less than two per cent
per annum, also chargeable against dividends. Certificates
of stock are immediately issued to the subscriber, who will
have all the rights of a stockholder except (1) the company
shall have a lien on the shares for the unpaid subscription
price and interest, and (2) if a subscriber fails to meet his
annual payments of five per cent, the company may, in its
discretion, immediately collect the entire balance of the sub-
scription price due and payable by suit or otherwise.
One difficulty with this plan is that it creates a possibly
undesirable debtor-creditor relationship between employee
and employer. To avoid this, in another plan of this type,
employees paid for the stock with cash obtained on unsecured
15-month notes to a commercial bank for 90 per cent of the
subscription price. The company paid the service charges
to the bank.31
30 E. R. SQUIBB & SoNs, PROSPECTUS 4 (Jan. 3, 1950). See also 3. P.
STEvENs & Co., PRosPEcTUs (Nov. 15, 1950); ARNOLD CONSTABLE & CO.,
PROSPECTUS (Jan. 15, 1951). It seldom happens that dividends alone will pay
for the stock, and regular payroll deductions are usually required. It is some-
times provided that a subscription must be paid in full within a specified period.
UNITED STATES PLYWOOD CORP., PROSPECTUS (Sept. 28, 1951).
31 See UNITED STATES PLYWOOD CoRP., supra note 30. It might be argued
that the employees realized taxable income where the employer discharged their
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In part, the tax results of this plan depend upon whether
it is found that there has been an actual sale on credit to the
employee, or that there has been a mere contract to sell. This
determination is, of course, a question of fact in each indi-
vidual case. There can be a "sale" even though the employee
is not obligated to contribute anything, but simply relies on
dividends being credited against the purchase price until it
is paid. 32  On the other hand, the use of the word "sale" is
not conclusive where other provisions of the contract between
employer and employee are inconsistent with the actual pas-
sage of title to the employee.33 In general, the following
factors have encouraged the courts to find that a "sale" had
taken place: the actual issuance and delivery to the employee
of the stock certificate; 34 the existence of a promissory note
evidencing the debt of the employee to the employer; -5 the
payment of interest on the balance due from the employee to
the employer.3 6 The converse of these factors, of course, is
evidence that only a mere contract to sell was intended.3 7
The difference in tax results as to whether a sale or a
contract to sell is found may, however, be substantial and
may be summarized as follows: if there is a "sale" with full
title in the employee, and only a security-interest lien held
by the employer, then, (1) the employer may deduct the
spread, if any, between market price and purchase price of
the stock at the time of the sale,3 8 (2) it may not deduct divi-
indebtedness for interest. Cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279
U. S. 716 (1929) ; United States v. Boston & Maine R. R., 279 U. S. 732 (1929).
As a practical matter, however, this arrangement might be regarded as another
"fringe benefit" to employees upon which the Treasury has not yet levied taxes.
If the question were to arise, presumably the employer would not be entitled to
an interest deduction on amounts paid the bank since it was not the debtor. It
might, however, be entitled to deduct these sums as additional compensation.
2 Lee v. Commissioner, 143 F. 2d 4 (7th Cir. 1944) ; A. Levy & J. Zentner
Co., 31 B. T. A. 386 (1934).33 Alger-Sullivan Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 57 F. 2d 3 (5th Cir. 1932).
34 See Moore v. Commissioner, 124 F. 2d 991 (7th Cir. 1941) (stock de-
livered in escrow).
3 A. Levy & J. Zentner Co., supra note 32. But see Indianapolis Glove Co.
v. United States, 96 F. 2d 816 (7th Cir. 1938).
36 See Moore v. Commissioner, supra note 34.
37 Cf. United States Steel Corp., 2 T. C. 430, 440 (Rev. by Ct.) (Acq.)(1943). Naturally, the presence or absence of no single factor will necessarily
be controlling.
38 At least this will be true if the employee is considered to have received
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dends credited against installment payments due on the
stock,39 and (3) it will realize interest income on the unpaid
balance of the purchase price even though this interest pay-
ment is set off against dividends. 40 The employee (1) is tax-
able on any spread existing on the date of sale,41 (2) is tax-
able on dividends credited against the purchase price though
not received,42 and (3) may deduct interest indirectly paid
as a charge against dividends. 43
The employee's basis for the stock is the amount he paid
plus any taxable spread at time of sale; that is, when his
right to the stock snaps shut, and not the fair market value
of the stock upon delivery.44 His holding period for the pur-
pose of determining whether a capital gain or loss is long-
term or short-term commences when he becomes uncondition-
ally entitled to all rights as a stockholder."
If it is determined, however, that there has not been an
actual sale of stock, but that there has been simply a contract
to sell in the future, the tax consequences to employer and
employee are different. In this event, the employer may de-
duct any spread only when the employee's right to the shares
accrues; 11 and it may deduct "dividends" credited against
compensation through a bargain purchase of stock. See Gardner-Denver Co.
v. Commissioner, 75 F. 2d 38, 40 (7th Cir. 1935).
39 True "dividends" do not become deductible compensation merely because
they are paid to employees. Cf. Gardner-Denver Co. v. Commissioner, supra
note 38; A. Levy & J. Zentner Co., 31 B. T. A. 386 (1934).
40 Hamilton Mfg. Co., 3 B. T. A. 1045 (1926).
41 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 2922(a)-1.
42 Cf. United States v. Joliet & Chicago R. R., 315 U. S. 44 (1942) ; Douglas
v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1 (1935) ; United States v. Boston & Maine R. R., 279
U. S. 732 (1929); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716
(1929) (a person is taxable on sums paid for him by third parties).
43 INT. Rav. CODE § 23(b). In many instances, however, this deduction will
be lost as a considerable number of lower-echelon employees will avail them-
selves of the standard deduction provided by Section 23(aa).
44 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-i.
45W. F. Marsh, 12 T. C. 1083 (1949); cf. Sommers v. Commissioner, 63
F. 2d 551 (10th Cir. 1933). Ordinarily, a mere executory contract to purchase
stock is not sufficient to commence a stockholder's holding period. Ethlyn L.
Armstrong, 6 T. C. 1166 (1946), aff'd, 162 F. 2d 199 (3d Cir. 1947). However,
where an employee has paid for his shares but has not yet received the cer-
tificate therefor, his ownership is unqualified and his holding period may be
said to have commenced at the time the shares are paid for even though not
delivered. Gordon M. Evans, 38 B. T. A. 1406 (Rev. by Ct.) (Acq.) (1938).
46 Again it is assumed that the stock is given with intent to compensate the
employee. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-i. Conversely, the employee will
be taxable on the spread only at this time.
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purchase price as additional compensation. 47  This distinc-
tion is important. Although the only difference to the em-
ployee between a determination that the payments represent
increased compensation, rather than true dividends, is the
applicability of withholding and social security taxes, 48 the
difference to the employer may be between paying with
18-cent or 100-cent dollars. 4  Thus it is not surprising that
some plans specifically spell out this point by providing that
these payments are to be increased compensation and not
dividends."0
Although this form of acquisition of stock by rank-and-
file employees offers certain advantages, as noted above, they
must be weighed against several disadvantages. If the em-
ployee makes no additional payments, merely crediting divi-
dends less interest against the purchase price will build up
his actual free and clear ownership interest in the stock so
slowly that he loses interest in the plan and the hoped for
incentive for more efficient work is lost. The employee must
pay taxes on the dividends credited his purchase account out
of other income; and if the market drops or if, for any reason,
he abandons the purchase plan, he may find that he has made
this tax outlay to no purpose. It has ordinarily been found
desirable not to have such substantial numbers of employees
in the position of debtors to the employer, at least not with-
out an option for the employee to cancel his subscription and
be relieved of his debt.
4 United States Steel Corp., 2 T. C. 430 (Rev. by Ct.) (Acq.) (1943);
A. M. Karagheusian, Inc., 2 CCH 1943 TC MEm. DEC. 1142 (1943) (court
noted that no cash was required to be paid by employees) ; accord, Indianapolis
Glove Co. v. United States, 96 F. 2d 816 (7th Cir. 1938) (court noted that no
interest was charged employees on demand notes taken in payment for stock and
the notes were never enforced); Alger-Sullivan Lumber Co. v. Commissioner,
57 F. 2d 3 (5th Cir. 1932); Hudson Motor Car Co. v. United States, 3 F.
Supp. 834, 847 (Ct. Cl. 1933). The employer may only take this deduction
where the employee's rights have become fixed or determinable. Cf. Thurman
v. Studebaker Corp., 88 F. 2d 984 (7th Cir. 1937). If the employee's rights
are forfeitable he may not accrue the deduction until the shares are actually
delivered. INT. Ray. CODE §23(p) (1).
48 INT. REV. CODE §§ 1621(a), 1426(a).
49 In the top excess-profits brackets the employer would reduce his taxes
by 82% of the amount paid the employee as compensation.
50 See J. P. STEVENS & Co., PRosPEcTus (Nov. 15, 1950) ; CLUETr PEABODY
& CO., PROSPECTUS (May 10, 1950).
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Option to Cancel
Ordinarily, a stock subscription, like any other contract,
cannot be abandoned by either party unilaterally; 1 and the
obligation to make payments on the unpaid subscription con-
tinues as the Board of Directors may make demand for pay-
ment.G2  Even where a contract to purchase stock provided
that the purchase price was to be paid out of dividends, it
was held that there was not a gift of stock, but that an im-
plied obligation arose to pay for the stock within a reasonable
time. A reasonable time would be determined, the court held,
from all the applicable circumstances; but the mere fact that
dividends were insufficient to pay for the stock did not re-.
lease the subscriber.5 3 Nevertheless management, as a prac-
tical matter, cannot enforce subscription contracts against
rank-and-file employees in a falling market, and as a matter
of elementary personnel relations it will not try to. Indeed,
the fear of being tied to an irrevocable commitment has been
held a major factor deterring employee participation in
employer-sponsored stock purchase plans.5 4  Consequently,
most plans provide that an employee may cancel his sub-
scription at his option, and that upon his doing so payroll
deductions will cease, and he will be refunded any money he
had already paid into the plan. Moreover, if the employee
forfeits his right to the stock upon cessation of payments,
the corporation will not be held to have realized taxable in-
come, although it has the stock and retains his partial pay-
ments as well.55
51 Stull v. Terry & Tench, Inc., 81 N. Y. S. 2d 43 (N. Y. City Ct. 1948).
52 Cf. Harr v. Wright, 164 Misc. 395, 298 N. Y. Supp. 270 (Sup. Ct. 1936),
aff'd, 250 App. Div. 830, 296 N. Y. Supp. 463 (4th Dep't 1937) ; N. Y. STOCK
CORP. LAv §§ 67, 68. Stock subscriptions have the status of a debt upon which
suit may be brought by the directors on behalf of the corporation. Rathbone
v. Ayer, 84 App. Div. 186, 82 N. Y. Supp. 235 (3d Dep't 1903); sec Stoddard
v. Lune, 159 N. Y. 265, 275, 53 N. E. 1108, 1110 (1899).
5 Cf. Parsons v. Lipe, 158 Misc. 32, 286 N. Y. Supp. 60 (Sup. Ct. 1933),
aff'd nere., 243 App. Div. 681, 277 N. Y. Supp. 428 (4th Dep't 1935), aff'd
,ern., 269 N. Y. 630, 200 N. E. 31 (1936) (stock to be paid for out of divi-
dends or otherwise).
54 SSB, STocK OPTION AND STOCK PURCHASE PLANS 58 (Oct. 1951). The
risk of loss of employee good-will through a stock plan in the event of a de-
clining market led at least one executive to remark, "We never had an em-
ployee stock purchase plan, thank God." SANDERS, EFnrc'rs OF TAXATION ON
ExzurivFs 121 (1951).
55 Commissioner v. Inland Finance Co., 63 F. 2d 886 (9th Cir. 1933);
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Substantially the same result of shifting the risk of a
decline in the market from the employee-purchaser to the cor-
poration would be accomplished by a repurchase agreement
whereby the company would agree, at least during a certain
period of time, to repurchase any employee's stock at the
price he paid for it. 6 There is some authority that if the
employee resells his stock to the corporation at a price
greater than the then market value of the stock he -will real-
ize ordinary income on the spread.57 The same case indicates
that in such event the payment by the company may be de-
ductible as additional compensation. 58
Instead of permitting the employee to cancel his sub-
scription or to sell his stock to the corporation, the employer
might simply agree to reduce the amount owing by a retro-
active reduction of the purchase price of the stock to its em-
ployees. Although the question of whether cancellation of
indebtedness represents income to the debtor is partially one
of intention, the courts have held that a debtor realizes no
income in such a case if the cancellation represents a readjust-
ment of the purchase price 9 This problem of releasing an
Chrysler Corp., 42 B. T. A. 795 (Rev. by Ct.) (Acq.) (1940). From a labor-
relations standpoint, of course, a forfeiture would be highly undesirable.
58 This is assuming, of course, that the employer would be in a position to
purchase such stock out of surplus. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 664. Here again,
it is open to the Commissioner to argue that till the repurchase period expires
the employee has a mere option.
57 Cf. William C. Atwater & Co., 10 T. C. 218, 247 (1948).
58 Ibid. However, this will be true only if the facts warrant such a
finding. Accordingly, in New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 2 T. C. 708 (1943),
aft'd, 146 F. 2d 697 (1st Cir. 1945), petitioner's management considered it good
business to repurchase in a declining market stock sold to its agents at the price
of the original sale for the purpose of retaining the agents' good will. A loss
deduction upon subsequent sale of the stock of the company was denied on
the ground that it was incurred for personal reasons not connected with the
actual cost of the stock. See also Koppers United Co., 2 CCH 1943 TC MEm.
DEc. 103 (1943), aff'd iner., 141 F. 2d 1023 (3d Cir. 1944), where deductions
were disallowed for bonuses compensating employees for losses on stock they
had bought in the company, where it did not appear under the facts that they
were granted as additional compensation.
59 Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F. 2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940) ; Helvering v.
Killian Co., 128 F. 2d 433 (8th Cir. 1942) ; cf. Pinkney Packing Co., 42 B. T. A.
823 (1940) ; Cherokee Co., 41 B. T. A. 1212 (1940). It may further be noted
that a reduction in purchase price of the securities resulting in a credit or refund
to employees would not be deductible by the corporation unless possibly it
could be shown that such payments were intended as additional compensation
and were reasonable under the circumstances. Cf. Western Maryland Dairy
Corp., 32 B. T. A. 769 (1935).
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employee from his subscription is also present in the next
plan discussed.
IV. SALE AT A DISCOUNT THROUGH DEIOSIT
SUBSCRIPTION
The essential difference between this plan and the fore-
going one is that instead of the employee owing money to
the employer and paying interest, the employer owes money
to the employee and it pays the interest. The financial at-
traction of this form of stock acquisition lies not in owner-
ship of stock with a small cash outlay, but in the purchase
of stock at a price below the current market. Under the
American Telephone & Telegraph Company Plan,"0 the
largest employee stock purchase plan presently in existence,
an employee makes an election to purchase stock, and con-
sents to deductions from his pay. These deductions are ac-
cumulated at two per cent interest paid by the company into
the employee's account until this account equals either 150
or $20 less than the average market price for that month,
whichever is lower, but not less than 100 per share. Prior
to this time the employee has no rights as a stockholder,
receives no dividends or certificates, and may cancel his elec-
tion to purchase and receive a refund of his money at any
time. If for any reason (e.g., temporary layoff) the employee
fails to make payment after a period of grace, the company
has the right to cancel the election to purchase and to return
the employee's deposits.
The advantage to the employee under this plan lies not
in quick ownership of stock with small cash outlay, but in
certain ownership, free of liens or debts, at a price below
current market. While the former considerations may be im-
portant in the case of a high-salaried executive who is seek-
6 0 AmERCAN TEL. & TEL. Co., PROSPECTUS (Jan. 5, 1950). See also Dow
CHEMICAL Co., PROSPECTUS (Dec. 10, 1949) (interest not paid); MINN.
MINING & MFG. Co., PROSPECTUS (Nov. 9, 1949); International Harvester Co.,
Employees' Common Stock Subscription Plan in STocK OWNERSHIP PLANS
FOR EMPLOYEES 23 (N. Y. Stock Exch. 1950); Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
Employee Stock Plan in STocK OWNERSHIP PLANS FOR EMPLOYEES 3S (N. Y.
Stock Exch. 1950) (interest not paid); DAYTON POWER & LIGHT CO., PROS-
PECTUS (Sept. 13, 1950).
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ing to acquire a large block of stock for control purposes, or
to realize large capital gains if his management is successful,
the incentive advantage to the corporation of a stock owner-
ship plan for lower-bracket employees requires only that the
employee own some stock, not a large block of stock. Al-
though the employee may not become a shareholder at once,
the payment of interest at savings bank rates on employee
deposits compensates for the fact that no dividends are re-
ceived until the purchase is complete, and gives him a feeling
of an immediate benefit under the plan. Finally, there is no
sense of owing money to his employer which may go on being
deducted from the rank-and-file employee's wages, even
though family emergencies may require all available cash at
once. These advantages seem to have made this the most
widely employed type of stock purchase plan.
Aside from the fact that interest credited to the employee
under this plan will be income to the employee and deductible
by the employer 61 the principal tax question involved in this
plan is the "bargain purchase" of stock below market price.
The ordinary rule, of course, is that no tax is payable on a
bargain purchase, except that the purchaser's basis for the
property is correspondingly reduced, and presumably his gain
will be increased when he sells the property.6 2 An exception
has been carved out of this general rule, however, by a Treas-
ury Regulation which provides that whenever property is
purchased by an employee from his employer for less than
its fair market value, the difference is a payment in the na-
ture of compensation and must be included by the employee
as ordinary income.6 3 The employee's basis for the stock ac-
quired is the amount paid for the stock plus the taxable
spread-or, in other words, the basis for the stock is its fair
market value when the employee acquires it. 64
Although, presumably, the Regulation was not pri-
marily intended to deal with the problem of rank-and-file
employee stock purchase plans, and although no cases have
6 1 NT. REv. CODE §§22(a), 23(b).62See Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 63, 69 (1937).
63 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-1.
04 Ibid. The employee's holding period to determine whether gain or loss
on the subsequent sale of the stock commences as indicated in note 45 supra.
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been found in which it was applied to a plan of this nature,
by its terms it makes no exceptions between executive and
lower-ranking employees. The rule, prior to promulgation
of the above-mentioned Regulation, had been that whether or
not income is realized by an officer or other employee on the
purchase of the employer's stock at less than market price
is to be determined from the intention of the employer in
permitting such a purchase. If the purchase was arranged
as consideration for services rendered, the gain represented
by the spread (although unrealized) to the employee consti-
tuted income subject to tax15 If the purchase was arranged
by the employer not to compensate the employee for services
rendered or to be rendered, but to enable him to acquire a
proprietary interest in the corporation employing him, the
purchase did not result in a realization of income even though
a spread existed.6 Sweeping away all these questions of fact
the Regulation now seems to embody a conclusive presump-
tion of intention to compensate.67  Although there has been
some question as to the validity of these regulations, 8 it is
doubtful that they would now be overturned by any court in
view of the fact that they were issued non-retroactively after
and in the light of the Supreme Court's broad language in
Commissioner v. Smith.69  Nevertheless, a few recent cases
65 Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U. S. 177 (1945); Martin L. Straus, II,
11 CCH 1952 TC MEm. DEc. 786 (1952). The Treasury view is that ordinarily
security and withholding taxes also apply. See WASHINGTON AND ROTHSCHILD,
COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 145 (Rev. ed. 1951).
66 Delbert B. Geeseman, 38 B. T. A. 258 (1938); Martin L. Straus, II,
supra note 65; Norman G. Nicolson, 13 T. C. 690 (Rev. by Ct.) (1949).
67 See Nelson, Stock Purchase and Bonus Plans, Qualified and Nonqualificd,
29 TAXES 890, 891 (1951).
68 See Friedman and Silbert, Stock Optim and Stock Purchase Plans,
8 N. Y. U. ANN. INST. FED. TAx. 433, 441 (1950).
69324 U. S. 177 (1945). "Section 22(a) of the Revenue Act is broad
enough to include in taxable income any economic or financial benefit con-
ferred on the employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by which
it is effected. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cominisitmer, 279 U. S. 716, 729.
The regulation specifically includes in income, property 'transferred . . . by
an employer to an employee, for an amount substantially less than its fair
market value,' even though the transfer takes the form of a sale or exchange,
to the extent that the employee receives compensation." Id. at 181. See also
Norman G. Nicolson, supra note 66. Cases such as Charles E. Adams, 39
B. T. A. 387 (1939), which overturned a more or less similar regulation were
decided prior to this pronouncement of the Supreme Court. But see Boland,
Employee Opticns Under the Federal Income Tax, 28 TAxls 415, 419 (1950)
(doubting that these Regulations were invalid).
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have come up with findings in the taxpayer's favor of pro-
prieta-y interest and not compensation, although the validity
of the Regulation was admittedly not in issue.70
In any event, from the standpoint of the employer it is
clear that if there is no income to the employee-purchaser on
a bargain purchase of stock, there will be no deduction to
the employer-seller. 71 Consequently, from the employer's
standpoint the importance of deductibility of amounts credit-
ed to employees under a stock purchase plan of this sort
makes a finding of compensation highly important to him
where large numbers of employees are involved. Accordingly,
where stock purchase plans for rank-and-file employees are
involved, it is decidedly to the employer's tax interest to sup-
port the above Regulation.
Whatever the position of the courts on the applicability
of this Regulation to stock purchase plans for the rank-and-
file employee, uniformly it has been the opinion of counsel,
on the basis of the Commissioner's rulings, that the difference
between contract price and market value of stock upon de-
livery to the employee was taxable as ordinary income to the
employee, 72 and subject to withholding as "wages.'" 73
Accepting this result, a number of employers have done
what they could to minimize the impact of these taxes on
their employees. Thus, despite the additional bookkeeping
involved, it has seemed desirable that the stock, together with
the taxable spread in price, be issued to employees in lots of
two to five shares as it is paid for, rather than waiting until
the entire subscription of, say, fifty shares is completed and
70 Malcolm S. Clark, 9 CCH 1950 TC MEm. DEC. 719 (1950); Martin L.
Straus II, 11 CCH 1952 TC MEm. DEC. 786 (1952).
71 .ee Electric Storage Battery Co., 39 B. T. A. 121, 132 (Rev. by Ct.)(Acq.) (1939); International Freighting Corp., 45 B. T. A. 716 (1941), aff'd,
135 F. 2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943); see WASHINGTON AND ROTHSCHILD, COMPEN-
SATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 166-67 (Rev. ed. 1951).
72 See AMERICAN TEL. & TEL. CO., PROSPECTUS (Jan. 5, 1950) ; CINCINNATI
GAS & ELEC. Co., PRosPECTus (March 15, 1950); Dow CHEMICAL Co., PROs-
PECTus 4 (Dec. 10, 1949); International Harvester Co., Employees' Comm-on
Stock Subscription Plan in STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS FOR EMPLOYEES 25(N. Y. Stock Exch. 1950).
73Ibid.; see INT. REV. CODE §§ 1621(a), 1426(a). Although these latter
taxes have relatively little impact upon the employee, their effect upon the
employer from the standpoint of administrative and clerical problems may be
not insignificant.
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thus requiring the taxation of the entire spread to the em-
ployee in one year.
Possibility That This Plan May Be
a Restricted Stock Option
It was noted above that, from a personnel-relations
standpoint, it is practically necessary to permit an employee
to cancel his stock subscription and receive his money back
at any time before final payment has been made. The pos-
sibility that this fact may unintentionally turn a stock
purchase plan into a stock option plan deserves further
exploration. 74
Section 130A of the Internal Revenue Code, added by
the Revenue Act of 1950, provided a statutory answer to the
much-debated question of whether the spread in connection
with stock options and stock purchases by employees would
be taxable at ordinary income rates under the compensation
theory, or at capital gains rates under the proprietary
theory.7 5 Briefly, if the stock option qualifies as a restricted
stock option, and the various other statutory requirements
are met, then upon transfer of a share to the employee pur-
suant to his exercise of the option "no income shall result
741ndeed, SSB, STOCK OPION AND STOCK PURCHASE PLANS (Oct. 1951)
asserts that, practically, there is very little difference between a stock purchase
and a stock option plan. The report speaks as follows (p. 28):
"But even though the terms of the 'purchase' are unequivocally binding
upon the employee without any neutralizing escape provisions, the panel
doubts that the 'purchase' transaction merits identification separate from
the 'option' for purposes of the stabilization program. It is thought that
these binding commitments are likely to be more illusive and optional than
their terms may seem to allow. This is true because the corporation, or
its stockholders, might incur serious hazards to its continuation as a going
concern, were technical enforcement of the formal terms to be undertaken.
It seems clear that the corporation, or its stockholders, would find it highly
disadvantageous and against the corporate welfare to attempt such en-
forcement against its 'top executives' or against its 'top executives and
key employees' who were parties to the 'purchase'. Either an action for
damages against those employees for breach of their contracts to buy, or
any suit sounding in specific performance would ruin every semblance of
order in the functioning of management. In short, functionally, the 'option'
element is likely to prove out as the reality of the 'purchase' transaction
regardless of the obligatory purport of its formal terms."
75 See, generally, Alexander, Employee Stock Options and the 1950 Revenue
Act, 6 TAX L. Rxv. 165 (1951); Lyon, Employee Stock Options Under the
Revenue Act of 1950, 51 COL. L. Rav. 1 (1951).
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at the time of the transfer of such share" or upon the exer-
cise of the option.76 Upon the subsequent sale of the stock
acquired pursuant to the option, the employee would pay
tax at capital gains rates upon the spread between the selling
price and the amount he paid for the stock, unless the option
price was 85 to 95 per cent of the market value of the stock
at the time the option was granted. In this latter case, the
employee realizes ordinary income upon subsequent disposi-
tion of the stock with respect to the difference between the
purchase price that he paid and the fair market value of the
stock when the option was granted.77 Finally, the section
provides that "no deduction under 23 (a) shall be allowable
to the employer-corporation with respect to the shares trans-
ferred" on exercise of the restricted stock option.
7 8
This last consideration would appear to be of the great-
est significance to an employer contemplating a stock pur-
chase plan for rank-and-file employees. Restricted stock
options were designed primarily as an incentive device for
increasing the compensation of corporate executives in the
high surtax brackets. If the corporation, in a possible 82
per cent tax bracket, is denied a deduction for compensation
paid, the aggregate of tax benefits accruing to rank-and-file
employees, each purchasing at best a few hundred dollars
worth of stock per year, seems small measured against the
enormous deduction that the corporation would lose. An
employee in the lower tax brackets simply does not yet have
the kind of tax or "incentive" problem that restricted stock
options were intended by Congress to alleviate. Thus, the
issuance of a restricted stock option to all employees would
seem, from the tax standpoint, an uneconomical method of
76 INT. REV. CODE § 130A (a) (1). To qualify as a restricted stock option, an
option must meet all these conditions: (1) it must be granted for any reason
connected with his employment to an employee owning less than 10% of the
employer's stock; (2) the option price must be at least 85% of fair market
value of the stock subject to option at the time the option is granted; (3) it
may not by its terms be transferable during life; (4) the stock subject to the
option must be held for two years after the option is granted and six months
after the transfer of the shares to the employee.
"7 INT. RFv. CODE § 130A(b).
78 INT. REv. CODE §130A(a) (2).
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increasing either their salaries or their proprietary interest
in the company.79
From still another standpoint the undesirability of wide-
spread restricted stock options may be noted. The justifica-
tion set forth on behalf of the issuance of restricted stock
options is that, by the incentive produced by a proprietary
interest in the employer-corporation, key executives are
spurred to greater efforts than they would be by a cash bonus,
most of which would go for taxes.8 0 They thereby create
additional profits for the company that it would not have
had without this option-produced incentive. Thus everyone
-stockholders, executives, and the economy as a whole-
benefits.
Accepting this argument at face value, it must be noted
that the number of executives in a company who make top-
policy decisions, and the quality of whose work alone could
significantly affect the fortunes of the enterprise, is limited.
The existence of restricted stock options in the hands of large
numbers of rank-and-file employees naturally dilutes the
incentive-producing value of such options in the hands of
top executives,81 and presumably minimizes the attendant
benefits.
Still further, whether or not an employer is entitled to
deduct the difference between option price and fair market
price on a restricted stock option for tax purposes, the fact
remains, as a matter of corporate accounting, that the non-
79 It must be remembered that a large number of rank-and-file employees
pay no income tax at all. Nevertheless, a number of corporations have granted
restricted stock options to rank-and-file employees for morale purposes or
otherwise. EASTERN Aip.mxEs, PROSPECTUS (Oct. 7, 1950); A. M. I., THE
CORPORATi DIRECTOR 6 (April 1952).
so See Hearings before Conmittee on Ways and Means on H. R. 6712,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1599 (1947). The only recent study of this subject, how-
ever, has cast some doubt on the extent to which high surtaxes have blunted
the efforts of business executives at any level. See SANDERS, EFFECTS OF
TAXATION ON EXECUTIVES c. 1 (1951).
81 It may be argued, of course, on the other hand that if every rank-and-
file employee were given the incentive of a restricted stock option, their com-
bined efforts would result in all the more spectacular increases in profits. In
fact, however, such devices as the restricted stock option may have diminished
value in the case of lower-echelon employees who may be subject to dismissal
for any lapses from regular company routine and who would generally prefer
to receive cash bonuses for valuable suggestions or improvements in efficiency.
See SANDERS, op. cit. supra note 80, at 122.
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employee stockholder's interest in his company is diluted by
such a transaction; and, for corporate accounting purposes,
this difference is charged in full against earnings after taxes
available for dividends as a form of compensation.8 2  Al-
though occasionally it may be necessary to consider the loss
of a tax deduction as an additional cost of compensation in
the case of a top executive, whose services may conceivably
be vital to the corporation at almost any price,8 3 it seems
both unnecessary and unfair to give rank-and-file employee
stockholders capital gains treatment at the expense of other
stockholders, when there are other means of rewarding these
employees with deductible bonuses that are equally effective
as incentive devices.84 We may conclude, therefore, that
out-and-out restricted stock options for rank-and-file em-
ployees do not seem desirable from a tax, business, or policy
standpoint.8 5
But, even if a stock purchase plan is not cast in the form
of an option, the possibility remains, as noted above, that
under the cancellation provisions of a dividends credit plan,
or the termination provisions of a bargain purchase plan,
the Commissioner, who generally has opposed capital gains
treatment of employee stock purchases 86 and has attempted
to tax any spread as ordinary income, may, with, an eye to
the greatest possible collection of total revenue, by denying
a deduction to the employer-corporation, insist that there is
present a restricted stock option. Reversing their previous
positions, the employer-corporation, if not the employee, will
contend that ordinary compensation is intended. 87
82 See ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULL. No. 37 (1948); FRUEHIAUF TRAILER
Co., PRosPECTUs (June 18, 1951). This is true even though a tax deduction
for compensation paid is denied under Section 130A(a).83 WASHINGTON AND ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECU-
TiVE 133 (Rev. ed. 1951).
s Waiver by a corporation of its tax deduction in connection with stock
options granted to executives has been a ground for complaint in stockholders'
derivative actions based on charges of waste of corporate assets. See Trun-
cale v. Universal Pictures Co., 76 F. Supp. 465 (S. D. N. Y. 1948); Horowitz
v. Balaban, Civil No. 42-437, S. D. N. Y., 1942 (settled in 1949). Unless
executives are included too generously in the plan, this argument loses force
in a stock purchase plan open to all employees.
85 See Mann, Deferred Compensation and Stock Option Plans May Be Legal,
But Are They Ethical?, 93 J. ACCOUNTANCY 324 (1952).
so See Extension of Remarks, 93 CONG. REc. A4319-25 (1947).
87 Cf. Patent Button Co., 11 CCH 1952 TC MEm. DEC. 262, 268 (1952).
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Methods of avoiding this loss of deduction on the part
of the employer-corporation are not so readily available as
might be supposed in the light of the technical provisions of
Section 130A, each one of which must be met if the option
is to qualify as a restricted stock option. As noted above, it
would undoubtedly be impracticable for the corporation, par-
ticularly in a falling market, to insist that a stock purchase
had been made, that no option had been intended, and con-
sequently that 130A did not apply. As a practical matter
the employer could not sue its rank-and-file employees on
stock subscription contracts on any large scale,88 while on
the other hand, a record of non-enforcement would help to
sustain a conclusion on the part of the Treasury that only
an option had been intended in the first place."
Qualification requirements with regard to the employees'
holding period of the stock, as set forth in Section 130A(a),
are probably not within the employer's control. It might be
possible, however, to disqualify the option, at least under
a "bargain purchase plan" such as that discussed above, by
setting the price of the stock at less than 85 per cent of mar-
ket price.0 Obviously, however, a spread this great may in
itself become costly (though not so costly as the loss of a
tax deduction) where a large number of employees are in-
volved. Again, the option might be disqualified if the option
provides by its terms that it is transferable.0 1 The apparent
difficulty with this arrangement, however, is that it defeats
In two recent plans tax counsel have noted the possibility that a longstanding
employee stock purchase plan might be treated as an option. AmEuCAN TEL.
& TEL. CO., PROSPECrUS (May 28, 1952); Dow CHEMICAL CO., PROSPECTUS
(Dec. 15, 1950). One commentator has concluded without citation of author-
ity, however, that it is not believed that Section 130A was intended to apply
to stock purchase plans for the rank-and-file employee. Nelson, Stock Pur-
chase and Bonus Plais, Qualified and Nonqualified, 29 TAXES 890, 891 (1951).
ss But see E. R. SQuBB & SONS, PROSPECTUS 3 (Jan. 3, 1950).89 See SSB, STOCK OPTION AND STOCK PURCHASE PLANS 27-28 (Oct. 1951).
90 In the opinion of counsel for Dow Chemical Company, such action made
the spread at the time the bargain purchase was completed wages to the em-
ployee and deductible compensation to the employer. Dow CHEMICAL Co.,
supra note 87. Any qualification (or in this case disqualification) argument
dependent on market price involves the possible difficulty of establishing what
the market price of the stock may be. This may be difficult in the case of
unlisted corporations. See Alexander, Employee Stock Options and the 1950
Revenue Act, 6 TAx L. Ray. 165, 182 (1951) ; Lyon, Employee Stock Options
Under the Revenue Act of 1950, 51 COL. L. REv. 1, 42 (1951).9 1 INT. REv. CODE § 130A(d) (1).
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the whole purpose of employee investment in the corporation
on a long-term basis, and may lead to widespread speculation
by employees. As a final measure of desperation, an em-
ployer might always engage in an up-hill battle in the teeth
of the statutory language to convince the courts that Section
130A simply was not intended to apply to stock~purchase
plans for the rank-and-file employee.
Although this "bargain purchase" type of employee
stock purchase plan solves many of the personnel problems
inherent in previous plans, the possibility that a tax deduc-
tion for the employer's contribution may be lost if the Com-
missioner contends that there is an unintentional restricted
stock option, may cause conservative management to look
further for a still more favorable stock purchase plan.
V. QUALIFIED PROFIT-SHARING PLAN
The acquisition of company stock by rank-and-file em-
ployees under this plan is effected through the use of an
employees' trust in connection with a profit-sharing plan
qualified under Section 165 of the Code. One of the best-
known of these plans is that operated by the Sun Oil
Company.92
The Sun Oil Company each year offers to its employees
a stock purchase plan whereby for a period of one year, the
employee pays to a trustee through payroll deductions such
amount of his salary as he elects, but not more than ten per
cent. This money in the hands of the trustee is matched by
the Company, out of profits, to the extent of fifty per cent
of each employee's contribution. The trustees then buy Sun
Oil Company common stock, usually on the open market,
although provision is made for the Company to issue stock
at an agreed price in the event stock is unavailable on the
open market. During the five-year period of the trust the
employee receives all cash dividends declared upon the stock
held by the trustees for his account, while stock dividends
92 See also Sears, Roebuck & Co., Employees' Sazgngs and Profit Sharing
Pension Fund in STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS FOR EMPLOYEES 30 (N. Y. Stock
Exch. 1950) ; PROCTOR & GAMBLE CORP., PROSPECTUS (Sept. 5, 1950).
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go into a surplus fund held by the trustees. If an employee
leaves the service of the Company during this period he re-
ceives only the stock attributable to his own contributions,
the Company's contributions going to the surplus fund. Upon
the termination of the trust, the employee receives the stock
he has paid for, the Company's contribution in stock, and
his pro rata share of the surplus fund consisting of stock
dividends and forfeitures of other employees.
This plan is designed to, and has in fact qualified under
Section 165 of the Code for the tax advantages granted to a
qualified profit-sharing plan for the exclusive benefit of em-
ployees. Although qualification is in each case a subject of
individual ruling, certain statutory standards must be met.
Qualification of Plan
To qualify, the plan must be for the exclusive benefit of
employees. Not only must it cover 70 per cent or more of
all employees (other than casual employees or those with less
than a minimum period of service), or 80 per cent or more
of all eligible employees, but it may not discriminate in favor
of officers, stockholders, supervisory, or highly paid em-
ployees.9 3 The sole purpose of the plan must be to offer
either employees or their beneficiaries a share of the profits
of the employer.9 4 The plan must be permanent, in writing,
and actually communicated to the employees.95
The tax consequences of the Sun Oil plan are, briefly,
as follows: (1) the employer-company may take an immediate
deduction for the fifty per cent "matching" contribution that
it pays to the trust, with the limitation that such deduction
9 3 INT. REV. CODE § 165(a).
94 Ibid., U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-1.
95 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-1. As to the requirement of permanency,
the employer may retain the right to terminate the plan without necessarily dis-
qualifying it. Ordinarily the plan may be withdrawn for business necessity.
U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §§ 29.165-1, -4; P. S. No. 7 (1944), P-H PEso AND
PROFIT SHARING SERV. 1 9505 (1944). Business necessity would probably not
include the mere fact that a plan was more expensive than the employer had
contemplated. In addition, it may be noted that the requirement of permanency
embodied in the Regulations does not necessarily mean that there must be reg-
ular, recurring contributions. Lincoln Elec. Co. Employees' Trust v. Commis-
sioner, 190 F. 2d 326 (6th Cir. 1951).
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may not be greater than fifteen per cent of the compensation
otherwise paid or accrued to all its employees under the
plan; OG (2) the trust fund need not pay income taxes on the
interest and dividends accruing to the trust fund; 97 (3) cash
dividends actually paid to the employee are, of course, tax-
able to him as ordinary income.9 8 Stock dividends and for-
feitures from other employees are not taxable to the
employee at the time they are received by the trust.99 Simi-
larly, forfeitures of company deposits and amounts in the
surplus fund do not constitute income to the company.100
(4) Upon the termination of the trust and the distribution
of the stock, employees are taxable upon the amounts re-
ceived as if they were paid as an annuity, the consideration
for which is the amount contributed by the employee. In
effect, this means that employees are taxed in the year each
payment is received upon the difference between the amount
of their contributions and the market value of the stock re-
ceived. 110 Their holding period for the stock commences at
this time,10 2 and their basis is the fair market value of the
stock upon distribution. 10 3  Although this entire amount is
taxable in one year, the fact that the company has instituted
a separate plan each year, permits the employee to achieve
some measure of income-leveling over a number of years. In
view of these features, a plan of this type must be deemed,
from the tax standpoint, the most desirable stock purchase
plan for the rank-and-file employee.10 4
9 6 INT. REV. CODE §23(p) (1).
97 INT. REv. CODE § 165 (a).
98 Since these are dividends and not compensation, no social security or
withholding taxes are applicable. It follows, however, that since this stock is
issued and outstanding in the hands of the trust, these dividends are not de-
ductible as additional compensation paid.
99 Cf. Chrysler Corp., 42 B. T. A. 795 (1940).
100 Ibid. There is no income realized by the beneficiary-employees at the
time contributions are made to this fund. Moreover under Pub. L. No. 589,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), amending Section 165(b), employees are not tax-
able on the unrealized appreciation of securities of an employer-corporation
distributed under a plan of this nature.
:10 INT. REv. CODE § 165(b).
102Harvey S. Strassburger, 37 B. T. A. 881 (1938).
103 See U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-1.
104 See CHEMICAL BANK & TRUST Co., THRIFT PLANS: A NEW ANSWER TO
AN OLD PROBLEM 10-11 (1952).
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V. CONCLUSION
Generally, stock purchase plans for rank-and-file em-
ployees now in effect seem to assume one of four principal
outlines. The simplest of these plans is a stock bonus plan
in which bonuses are paid in the employer's stock rather than
in cash. Although from the standpoint of taxation the em-
ployer's deduction and the employee's income problems are
fairly straightforward, a plan of this type is expensive, and
conflicts with the employees' desire that any regular bonus
be paid in cash.
If an employer is unwilling simply to give stock to its
employees, it may sell stock to them on easy terms and per-
mit the stock to pay for itself, in whole or in part, by credit-
ing dividends against the purchase price. The tax results of
this plan depend in part upon whether there has been an
actual sale on credit or a mere contract to sell-a question
of fact in each case.
The third type of plan involves a subscription contract
under which stock is sold to employees at a discount from
market price. Since this plan avoids the possible difficulties
inherent in a debtor-creditor relationship between employer
and employee, and since the employer should be entitled to
deduct the spread between market price and purchase price
in most instances, this plan may prove to be suitable in many
cases for the purchase of stock by rank-and-file employees.
However, a provision permitting cancellation of the em-
ployee's subscription (a practical necessity), or even a settled
practice to this effect, may lead the Commissioner to insist
that, in fact, a restricted employee stock option has been
granted, and that consequently, the employer loses his de-
duction for compensation on any difference between market
price and purchase price. In the case of rank-and-file em-
ployees, this large tax loss to the employer will not be offset
by the favorable tax treatment given the employee by the
provisions of the Code dealing with restricted stock options.
An employee stock purchase plan which qualifies as a
profit-sharing plan under Section 165 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code insures the employer a deduction for his contribu-
tions, and consequently, is the most desirable from a tax
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aspect. From a labor-management viewpoint it is also highly
desirable, since it combines the incentive feature of a sense
of immediate gain to the employee, while at the same time
allowing him to withdraw at any time. Moreover, it does
not commit the employer to a fixed charge against income
through good years and bad. However, a profit-sharing plan,
like a tiger once mounted, cannot be easily abandoned. To
the extent profits may exist, they must be shared pursuant
to the plan. Although the amount of the employer's contri-
butions may vary from year to year, an attempt to terminate
the plan at an early date will involve grave risks from both
the tax and the labor relations standpoint.
